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ABSTRACT
Background Although higher taxation of tobacco
products is considered the most cost-effective tobacco
control policy, its negative impact on low-income groups
is one of the arguments used against it.
Objective To investigate the impact of current excise
taxes and the increases of excise taxes on tobacco and
household expenditures by expenditure tertiles, and
examine who pays excise taxes in general.
Method Impacts of excise taxes on cigarettes are
examined with a budgetary approach. We first estimate
the price elasticity of cigarettes by expenditure tertiles
using data from the 2003 Turkish Household
Expenditure Survey, the most recent data set covering
detailed tobacco product information relevant to our
analysis. We then conduct a number of simulation
analyses by increasing the excise taxes per pack of
cigarettes and examine the impacts of these increases on
household expenditures. Finally, as excise tax increases,
we predict the total excise tax paid by households in
different expenditure tertiles and compare the
concentration curve of excise tax spending with the
Lorenz curve showing the cumulative share of total
household expenditures by expenditure tertiles. We
estimate the progressivity coefficient that measures the
area between the Lorenz and concentration curves.
Results The low-income group is found to be the most
sensitive to tax and price increases. It spends a relatively
higher share of the household expenditure on cigarettes
compared with higher income groups. However, the
results suggest a different outcome as excise tax
increases; the share of household expenditures spent on
cigarettes declines for all household tertiles but a
significant reduction occurs on the lowest expenditure
tertile, suggesting that increases in excise taxes are
progressive. Furthermore, the highest expenditure tertile
pays the highest excise tax among expenditure tertiles,
and their share in total excise revenue increases as the
excise tax per pack of cigarettes increases.
Conclusions The poor smoking households benefit the
most from increases in excise taxes; from a budgetary
perspective, as they reduce their smoking consumption
significantly, the share of their excise payment in total
household expenditures declines. From a health
perspective, they are likely to have more health benefits
as their consumption reduces. Government revenues are
also predicted to increase with increased excise taxes,
and the government can allocate a part of these revenue
increases on implementing and enforcing other tobacco
control measures including cessation support and smoke-
free environments.
INTRODUCTION
Increasing taxes on tobacco products is found to be
one of the most cost-effective ways of preventing
tobacco-attributable deaths and diseases.1 2 This
policy tool is especially useful in developing
countries where 70% of tobacco-related prevent-
able deaths are expected to occur by 2030.1
Despite the expected benefits, governments have
many concerns about increases in excise taxes, par-
ticularly the impact of higher taxes on poor
smokers.
A wealth of studies examine whether taxes create
burdens on low-income households. Some econo-
mists claim that the impact of cigarette excise taxes
is higher on the poor since the poor disproportion-
ately smoke tobacco more than the rich, and that
they spend a larger share of their income on
tobacco.3–13 Evidence from low-income and
middle-income countries report that the share of
cigarette expenditure in household income or
expenditure varies between 4.25% and 7.2% for
low-income households and between 1.65% and
3% for the higher income households.14–17
Taxes are classified as regressive when the poor
pay a higher share of their income in tax than the
rich. As taxes increase, those who continue to
smoke will be hurt by higher taxes, and those who
quit will be worse off because they gave up some-
thing that gave them higher utility.18–20 Chaloupka
and Warner19 argue that tax increases may not be
regressive since tax-induced behavioural change
towards quitting will benefit poor smokers’ health
as well as savings that would otherwise be spent on
tobacco consumption because the poor are more
sensitive to higher prices than the rich in low-
income and middle-income countries where price
elasticity ranges from −1.9 to −0.15 among the
poor and −1.48 to +0.51 among the rich.2i
Evidence from the existing literature is mixed in
terms of who carries the increase in tax burden
when excise taxes on tobacco increase. For
example, Townsend4 5 finds that those in the
lowest social class are more sensitive to price
changes; they are more likely to alter their smoking
behaviour to reduce the burden of tax increases.
Borren and Sutton 8 find that men in the lowest
social class pay over eight times more in increased
tax than men in the highest social class in the UK.
Viscusi12 argues that cigarette taxes in the USA fell
predominantly on the very poor. Gospodirov and
Irvine21 find that price elasticity for different socio-
economic groups is almost flat, and therefore the
concerns about burden of tax increases are valid
for Canada.ii On the other hand, Younger et al22
found that in Madagascar excise taxes on tobacco
are progressive but argue that households under-
report their tobacco and alcohol consumption in
iPlease see chapter 5[2] for a detailed summary of existing
price elasticity literature.
iiOther summary discussions of the impact of cigarette
excise taxes are in [2] and [18].
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their survey. In another study, Rajemison et al23 combine cigar-
ettes and Parkaway, which is not taxed and mostly consumed by
the poor, and report that tobacco excises are neutral in
Madagascar.
In this paper, we have two aims. The first aim is to shed light
on the argument on whether increases in excise taxes put a
burden on the poor smokers by using a budgetary approach,
and how tax-induced price increases affect their smoking behav-
iour. The second aim, from the policy perspective, is to show
the impact of excise increases on tax revenues and to determine
who pays the taxes so that the governments can allocate extra
revenues for smoking cessation for those who cannot quit
smoking. To achieve these aims, we will examine the impact of
increases in excise taxes on cigarettes by expenditure tertiles in
Turkey. Turkey is an interesting country with a high smoking
prevalence and intensity of smoking where 27.1% of adults
smoke cigarettes as of 2012.24 Furthermore, the share of excise
and total taxes on retail price increased from 55.3% and 70.5%
in 2003 to 65.3% and 81% in 2013, respectively.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
This study uses the 2003 Turkish National Household
Expenditure Survey (THES), conducted by the Turkish
Statistical Institute (TSI). It is a nationally representative ran-
domly selected household survey that covers urban (eg, popula-
tion over 20 000) and rural areas of 12 regions in Turkey. The
total number of households surveyed is 25 764. This is the only
available of household data that records all household expendi-
tures including tobacco products and cigarettes by brand.
The data represent household income and consumption pat-
terns as well as expenditures on goods and services. Members
of households who agree to participate in the survey are asked
to record their daily consumption and expenditures during a
period of 1 month. Expenditures include food and non-
alcoholic drinks, alcohol and cigarettes, outwear and shoes,
household utilities, furniture, health, transportation, communi-
cation, entertainment, education, recreation and other goods
and services that the household buys during the month of the
survey. The consumption and expenditure patterns are recorded
by household level, as the demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics of the household head as well as each household
member are recorded. These include age; sex; employment
status; if unemployed, the reasons; types of work engaged in;
income earned; education level; and type of health insurance, if
they have any.
Methodology
The methodology of this study consists of two parts. First, we
categorise households into three expenditure tertiles based on
their per capita-household expenditure levels and estimate the
cigarette demand using a two-part demand model. Second, we
examine the incidence of existing cigarette taxes and increases
in cigarette excises according to the budgetary approach by
using the parameters estimated by the demand model. Here, we
estimate the impacts of current cigarette taxes and increases in
cigarette taxes by each expenditure tertile. Then we draw con-
centration curves of tobacco tax expenditures, pretax and
post-tax increases and a Lorenz curveiii for household
expenditure by adopting the methodology developed by
Yitzhaki and Slemrod.25 We estimate the progressivity coeffi-
cientiv similar to that adopted by Younger,26 the area between
the concentration curve for total household expenditures
(Lorenz curve) and the concentration curve for taxes paid.
Smoking behaviour of households: demand for tobacco products
A two-part model developed by Cragg27 is used to estimate the
price elasticity of cigarette demand. In the first stage, the house-
hold’s propensity to smoke is estimated by using a logit model.
A household that has positive tobacco expenditure is identified
as a ‘smoker household.’ The dependent variable, SMOKER,
takes the value 1 if the household has positive tobacco expend-
iture (smoker households) and zero otherwise. The following
logit model is estimated:
Probability(SMOKER = 1) ¼ pi ¼ e
ðb0þb XiÞ
1þ eðb0þb XiÞ ð1Þ
where Xi is the vector of explanatory variables representing the
price measured with the total expenditure per pack of 20 cigar-
ettes, total household expenditure as a proxy for household
income and the other socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics of household i. These variables are listed in
table 1. b represents the vector of coefficients of explanatory
variables in the model.
In the second stage, a conditional demand model is applied to
estimate the intensity of smoking by smoker households only.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number
of packs of 20 cigarettes purchased by the household i during
the month of the interview (ln Ci). The following model is esti-
mated using an ordinary least squares regression technique.
LnCi ¼ u0 þ u1 ln (Xpi)þ u
0
Xi þ 1i ð2Þ
Ci includes all tobacco products including cigarettes, cigarillos
and loose tobacco consumed in a household. The quantities of
non-cigarette products consumed by the households are con-
verted to cigarettes by assuming that 1 g of loose tobacco is
equivalent to one cigarette and one cigarillo is the same as one
cigarette.v u1 is the price (expenditure) elasticity of tobacco
demand and u
0
is the vector of coefficients corresponding to the
vector of explanatory variables Xi, as explained in table 1. The
same explanatory variables are used in both models.
The price of a cigarette (Xpi) is estimated by dividing the
total tobacco expenditure of the household i by their total
iiiIn economics, the Lorenz curve is used to identify the inequality of
income distribution. It shows the percentage of expenditures paid by the
bottom x% of households. The x-axis shows the percentage of
households whereas the y-axis shows the percentage of expenditures
spent by that group. It plots the cumulative expenditures against the
cumulative distribution of households. The more convex the Lorenz
curve, the greater the inequality of household expenditures. The 45°
line indicates the equality of distribution over all household percentiles.
ivIf the share of taxes paid by household tertiles equals to the share of
these tertiles in household expenditures, then progressivity coefficient
will be zero. It is negative (positive) if the concentration curve of tax
payments is less (more) convex than the concentration curve of
household expenditures (Lorenz curve). A negative coefficient indicates
that the share of each tertile in tax expenditures is higher than the share
of tertiles in household expenditures. Negative (Positive) values indicate
a regressive (progressive) tax.
vIn the survey, there were 14 866 smoker households. Only one
household reported that they consumed cigars; three households
reported that they consumed pipe tobacco; 84 households reported that
they purchased loose tobacco during the month of the survey.
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tobacco product consumption measured in units of 20 cigarettes
a pack among smoking households.vi We first estimate the
average price per pack by region and within region by rural and
urban areas and by the month of survey. Then we calculate the
weighted average price for each subgroup and those values are
assigned to each household in these subgroups regardless of
their smoking status in order to eliminate the endogeneity
problem. We assume that since non-smoking households do not
report any expenditure on tobacco, they still face a price regard-
less of their smoking status and that may affect their non-
smoking behaviour.
The surveys were conducted during 2003 and the average
monthly inflation rate was 1.43%. Each household was surveyed
only once during the year. Therefore, in order to compare all
households, all monetary values (prices, taxes and expenditures)
are deflated to June 2003 levels using the consumer price index.
All estimates are weighted, so the results can be generalised for
the whole nation. We classify households based on total house-
hold expenditures per adult equivalent and estimate equations
(1) and (2) for each of the expenditure tertiles.
Tax incidence analysis
The budgetary approach takes the traditional view of incidence
analysis; it compares the share of cigarette taxes on the house-
hold expenditures, and calculates the tax burden by income or
expenditure groups. Using this approach, we estimate the current
as well as increases in excise tax incidence by expenditure tertiles.
The excise tax rate (t) applied to all tobacco products in 2003
is the same. It was 49.5% of the retail price between January
and July; at the beginning of August, the rate increased to
55.3% of the retail price, inclusive of excise tax, vii value added
tax (VAT) and retailers’ margin. The statutory VAT rate is 18%,
which is equivalent to 15.25% of retail price. Hence, the price
or household tobacco expenditure per pack ðXpiÞ has the fol-
lowing components:
Xpi ¼ Producer Price
þ Excise taxþ VAT ¼ Producer Price þ ðXpi  tÞ
þ ðXpi  0:1525Þ
ð3Þ
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that producers adjust retai-
lers’ margin from their own price. We estimate the total excise
tax expenditure (EXPk) spent by each expenditure tertile k as
follows:
EXpk ¼ Nk  pk  Ck  Tk ð4Þ
where Nk is the number of households, pk is the mean predicted
smoking prevalence rate of households, Ck is the predicted mean
consumption of smoker households and Tk is the average excise
tax paid per pack by households in expenditure tertile k. Then





where HXpk is total smoker households’ expenditure in tertile k.
In order to investigate the impact of the increase in excise tax
on tax incidence, we hypothetically increase the excise value per
pack paid by each household by 10%, 25%, 50% and 75%. We
assume that producers fully transfer the tax increases to con-
sumer prices. As excise tax increases, the new price per pack
paid by each household, X pi, is predicted as follows:
Xpi ¼ Producer Priceþ Ti þ Vi ð6Þ
where Ti ¼ Old excise tax= pack (1þ t) is the new excise tax
expenditure per pack, and t is the rate of excise per pack
increases as mentioned above. Vi ¼ [15:25%Xpi] is the new
VAT tax paid per pack. The tax incidence of higher excise tax
on household tertiles are estimated using the percentage change
in the prices as a result of a hypothetical increase in excise
taxes, total price elasticity reported in table 4 and the percent-
age change in total cigarette consumption for each tertile.
Table 1 Definition, mean and SD of the explanatory variables
Variables by Household i Definition All households Smoker households
lnðXp)i The natural logarithm of the tobacco expenditure equivalent to per pack of 20 cigarettes 14.25 (0.19)
ln(HXpPcÞi The natural logarithm of total household expenditure per adult equivalent* 19.34 (0.68) 19.38 (0.66)
Age1i The share of household members 15 years old or younger 0.25 (0.23) 0.27 (0.22)
Age2i The share of household members 55 years old or older 0.17 (0.31) 0.11 (0.23)
Edui The share of adults with education equivalent to high school and above 0.26 (0.35) 0.27 (0.35)
Married2 Equals 1 if the household head is married, zero otherwise 0.89 (0.31) 0.91 (0.28)
AdMALEi The percentage share of an adult male 0.35 (0.18) 0.36 (0.18)
Unempi The percentage of adult household members currently looking for a job 0.04 (0.12) 0.04 (0.13)
ManInsi† The percentage of household members who have mandatory health insurance coverage 0.64 (0.45) 0.62 (0.45)
VoIInsi The percentage of household members who have voluntary health insurance coverage 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.08)
WhiteColi The percentage of adults who have a professional occupation 0.64 (0.34) 0.61 (0.33)
Post Julyi Equals 1 if the household was interviewed before July, zero otherwise 0.42 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49)
N Number of households 25 764 14 868
SDs of the explanatory variables are reported in parentheses.
*In the calculation of total expenditure per adult, the size of the household is converted into the number of adults using the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
procedure, which gives a weight of 0.3 for those less than age 14, a weight of 0.5 for children over age 14 and a weight of 1 for adults.
†If the household head is employed by the government and some institutions, they will get mandatory health insurance. Even though some of them are covered by the mandatory
insurance, they also get voluntary insurance if there is a higher probability that the family member is sick.
viDeaton28 identifies that the ratio of total cigarette expenditure to total
cigarettes as expenditure rather than price per pack of cigarettes and its
elasticity as expenditure elasticity rather than price elasticity. For the
sake of convenience, we refer them as price and price elasticity.
viiWe multiplied the expenditure with the appropriate excise taxes for
those households who reported their tobacco expenditures during the
months before and after July 2003.
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We estimate a progressivity coefficient, the area between the
share of excise tax payments (concentration curve) and the
share of total household expenditures, in order to understand
whether the tax increases are progressive overall. The coefficient




The intensity and prevalence rate of smoking by all households
and expenditure tertiles are reported in table 2. Both the preva-
lence of smoking households and the intensity of smoking are
higher in the high expenditure tertile. Intensity of smoking
increases when we estimate the consumption level by per adult
equivalent, based on the average number of adults per house-
hold over 15 years of age. Clearly, the higher the expenditure of
households (eg, rich households), the higher the intensity of
smoking. High, middle and low expenditure tertiles spend on
average $1.18, $1.13 and $1.04/pack of cigarettes, respectively.
The total monthly quantity of tobacco use (equivalent to a
pack of 20 cigarettes) is estimatedix to be around 313 million
packs where the low, middle and high tertiles smoke 30%, 35%
and 34%, respectively, of the total reported quantity of cigarette
consumption (table 3). Turkish households spend approximately
US$338 million per month in terms of June 2003 prices on
cigarettes, which is equivalent to 6.3% of the total monthly
household expenditure of smoker households.
As expected, the burden of tobacco expenditure decreases as
household expenditure increases (table 3). In 2003, it is esti-
mated that the poor spend a higher share of total household
expenditure—about 10% on tobacco, whereas the rich spend
4.5%. The poor also pay a higher percentage of their total
household expenditure on excise tax: 5.2% compared with the
rich households’ 2.4%. However, the total excise paid in 2003
is estimated to be around US$176 million per month, and the
rich pay more than 42.5% of the total excise tax revenues while
the poor pay only 23%.
Elasticity estimates
Table 4 reports the price and income elasticity of demand for
cigarettes by expenditure tertiles calculated using a bootstrap-
ping technique. The results of the two-part model are presented
in the online appendix (table A). The price and income sensitiv-
ity of smoking participation is found to decrease monotonically
with expenditure. Both the participation and conditional
demand elasticities are found to be highest (in absolute terms)
for the poor households. It is consistent with the elasticity esti-
mates in other developing countries.2
Turkish smokers are found to be more price sensitive than
smokers in many countries. For example, the price elasticity of
the poor group is estimated at (−1.41) in Turkey, higher (in
absolute value) than the price elasticity of the poor in the USA,
where Hersch29 and Gruber and Köszegi20 report the price elas-
ticity of the poor to be −1.18, and −1.09, respectively.
Tax incidence simulation analysis
The predicted and hypothetical excises paid and their share in
total household expenditures by expenditure tertile are given in
table 5. Although the burden of the current tax falls heavier on
the low expenditure tertile (poor) where they spend 10.7% of
their household expenditure on tobacco, the excise increases are
estimated to be progressive. In fact, as excise taxes increase, the
excise tax burden as a proportion of income decreases for the
poor but the proportion of cigarette expenditures on total
household expenditures declines for all tertiles.
The decline in the burden of tax increases is also supported
by the progressivity coefficient and concentration curves. The
coefficient was declining as the tax rate on cigarettes was
increasing (table 6). Figure 1 shows that as excise tax on cigar-
ettes increases by 50% and 75% from its current level, the
cumulative distribution of the tax payments by expenditure ter-
tiles approaches to the concentration curve of household expen-
ditures (Lorenz curve). Although the burden of the taxes still
persists, the proximity to Lorenz curve suggests that the burden
on the poor declines (more progressive) with tax increases.
As excise tax increases, government tax revenue from cigar-
ettes (excise+VAT) also increases at a moderate level (table 7).
The contribution of the poor to total cigarette excise revenue
declines as excise tax increases. In the pretax increase period
(base case), the poor are estimated to contribute 23.8% of total
cigarette excise revenue, and as the excise per pack increases by
75%, the burden on the poor declines (more progressive) with
tax increases. The rich, on the other hand, increase their contri-
bution to almost half of the total excise tax revenue (48.5%) as
the excise per pack increases by 75%, compared with their con-
tribution of 42.2% at the pretax increase period.
Table 2 Smoking prevalence rates and intensity in 2003
All households
Expenditure tertiles
The poor Middle The rich
Smoking prevalence rate by households (%) 57.6 54.1 59.1 59.5
Average tobacco expenditures (price)/pack equivalent (in TL)* 1.58 1.47 1.59 1.67
Average number of packs smoked by smoking households per month 32.5 31.5 32.7 33.1
Average number of packs smoked per adult in smoking households per month 13.2 11.0 13.5 15.5
Number of households (unweighted) 25 764 9023 8817 7924
Number of households (weighted) 16 735 975 5 523 059 5 689 296 5 523 619
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2003 Turkish National Household Expenditure Survey data.
*In June 2003, US$1 was 1.41 TL.
viiiLet (Xk, Yk) be the known points on the Lorenz curve, where Xk is
indexed in increasing order (Xk−1 <Xk) and is the cumulated
proportions on the horizontal line (in our case, tertiles) for k=0,1,…,5,
where k is tertile with X0=0 and X5=1, and Yk is the cumulated
proportion of expenditure or the tax-paid variable for k=0,1,2,3, with
Y0=0 and Y3=1. Then, the Gini coefficient is calculated as follows:
G ¼ 1P3k¼1 ðXk Xk1ÞðYk þ Yk1Þ:
ixThe total tobacco use is estimated using the THES data and the
weights of each household surveyed. It represents the total consumption
in the survey year in Turkey.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In recent years, many countries have tried to reform their tax
system, mainly to increase the efficiency of tax collection, to
facilitate its administration and to generate more revenues to be
spent on social programmes. Although many countries enjoy
higher revenues as they increase cigarette excise taxes, the
policy decisions about such increases often pay little attention to
their effect on inequality. In this study, we evaluate the progres-
sivity of increases in excise tax in Turkey by using data from the
2003 THES. Our results show that when excise taxes increase,
the burden of excises declines given the greater price sensitivity
of smoking among lower income groups. This is more likely to
be true in low-income/middle-income countries where there are
similar patterns of tobacco use and where the same patterns for
price sensitivity are likely. Furthermore, the tax-induced increase
in total revenues could be used to compensate for the
tax-induced burden on the poor, offsetting the burden even
further.
Increasing tobacco excise taxes is good for both fiscal and
health policy.30 31 Clearly, one way to offset the burden of
tobacco taxes may be to generate revenues to be spent in a pro-
gressive manner, especially on social programmes that the poor
would benefit from, instead of reducing excise tax rates or sig-
nificantly differentiating tax rates among tobacco products to
alleviate the burden of excise taxes on poor smokers. Indeed,










Cigarettes exp. as a %
of total HHs exp
Total excise tax
exp (million USD)
Excise exp as a %
of total HH exp
The poor 93 963 792.4 79.1 10.0 41.1 5.2
The middle 106 916 1435.1 115.3 8.0 60.1 4.2
The rich 112 098 3178.0 143.8 4.5 74.8 2.4
Total
households
312 977 5405.5 338.2 6.3 176.0 3.3
Authors’ calculations using the 2003 Turkish National Household Expenditure Survey data.
Table 4 Tobacco and total price (expenditure) elasticities by
expenditure tertiles
Expenditure tertiles
The poor Middle The rich
Price (tobacco expenditure per pack) elasticity
Participation −0.445 −0.238 −0.213
(0.064) (0.067) (0.076)
Conditional demand −0.967 −0.577 −0.528
(0.140) (0.162) (0.187)
Total −1.412 −0.816 −0.741
(0.204) (0.229) (0.262)
Income (total household expenditure) elasticity
Participation 0.073 0.023 −0.009
(0.023) (0.040) (0.017)
Conditional demand 0.160 0.055 −0.021
(0.051) (0.098) (0.041)
Total 0.233 0.078 −0.030
(0.075) (0.138) (0.058)
SE are reported in parentheses. The models specified in equations (1) and (2) are
estimated 200 times. The values presented in this table are the estimated average
elasticities using the coefficients on tobacco expenditures per pack (proxy for price)
and total household expenditure (proxy for income) variables. All elasticity estimates
are significant at 1%.
Table 5 Predicted and hypothetical tax paid as a per cent of household expenditure
Expenditure tertiles
The poor (%) Middle (%) The rich (%) Overall (%)
Predicted excise expenditures as a per cent of smoker household expenditures
Base case 5.5 4.3 2.4 3.4
Hypothetical 10% excise increase 5.5 4.5 2.5 3.5
Hypothetical 25% excise increase 5.3 4.7 2.7 3.6
Hypothetical 50% excise increase 4.6 4.8 2.8 3.6
Hypothetical 75% excise increase 3.3 4.7 2.9 3.4
Predicted cigarette expenditures as a per cent of smoker household expenditures
Base case 10.7 8.3 4.7 6.5
Hypothetical 10% excise increase 10.3 8.4 4.7 6.5
Hypothetical 25% excise increase 9.6 8.4 4.8 6.4
Hypothetical 50% excise increase 7.9 8.1 4.7 6.1
Hypothetical 75% excise increase 5.4 7.6 4.5 5.4
In estimating the excise expenditures in the base case, we predict the prevalence rate and consumption for each household by using the estimated coefficients of equations (1) and (2)
and calculate their mean predicted prevalence rate, pk , and mean predicted consumption level equivalent to a pack of 20 cigarettes for each expenditure tertile k, ÅCk . Then they are
multiplied with the excise tax per pack and the weighted number of the household in each tertile to calculate the total excise tax expenditure in each tertile. The new cigarette
expenditures after the excise tax increase are predicted in a similar way using the percentage change in price with excise tax increase and price elasticities reported in table 4.
Before the number of cigarettes smoked by each household is estimated, the existence of heteroscedasticity is estimated for each tertile using the White test. We did not reject the null
hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogeneous for each expenditure tertile. Moreover, we did not reject the normality of the residuals. In order to not impose the
normality distribution of the error terms, we assume that the distribution of the error term is not known and a non-parametric smearing estimator is used.34 Hence, the smearing
estimator is calculated as follows35: f ¼ ð1=NÞ PNi¼1 eÃ1
 
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since tobacco has the potential to generate more revenue for
governments, at least in the short term, redistribution policies
might favour the poor by encouraging governments to spend
more funds on education, health and social assistance pro-
grammes. These programmes would be beneficial not only for
poor smokers but also for the poor in general. In fact, this is
exactly what the Turkish government has done, by implement-
ing effective tobacco control policies and allocating more money
on smoking cessation programmes. As a result, between 2008
and 2012, Turkey reduced its overall prevalence rate of smoking
from 32% to 27%.24
The existing literature suggests that the long-term price elasti-
cities are higher than the short-term price estimates.2 Although
we did not estimate the long-run price elasticities in this study,
we expect that in the long run, households in the low-income
group will continue to reduce their expenditure more than
those in the higher income groups. Furthermore, the Turkish
government generates significant revenues from cigarettes, and
can allocate funds for programmes that benefit the poor. In fact,
the Turkish government introduced national health insurance,
significantly subsidised for the poor.
In the interpretation of the results, one should keep in mind
that the results are based on the elasticity estimates using expen-
ditures and at the household level rather than individual level.
The use of household elasticity may result in the underestima-
tion of price elasticity because none of the household members
will purchase any cigarettes for that household which is consid-
ered as a non-smoker household. On the contrary, Deaton32
points out that the use of prices calculated as a ratio of house-
hold cigarette expenditures to total cigarette purchases may
result in the overestimation of price elasticities if households
switch to lower priced cigarettes when their prices increase.
Classification of households into tertiles based on their total
expenditures rather than their income can be considered as a
strength of this study because Poterba33 argues that an
Figure 1 Concentration curve for
total excise tax payments on cigarettes
and the Lorenz curve for household
expenditures.
Table 6 Progressivity coefficient at the current excise tax rate and
when excise taxes are increased by 50% and 75%
Current excise Increase in excise tax
Tax level 50% 75%
Progressivity coefficient −0.2028 −0.1306 −0.0676
Table 7 Contribution of expenditure tertiles to government
revenues
Expenditure tertiles
The poor Middle The rich Overall
Government revenues (in billion TL) when excise tax increases by
Base case 61 044 86 861 108 114 256 019
10% 61 312 90 735 113 495 265 542
25% 59 734 94 912 119 723 274 369
50% 51 827 97 521 125 186 274 535
75% 37 328 94 690 124 507 256 526
Government revenues (in thousand $US) when excise tax increases by
Base case 43 244 61 533 76 589 181 367
10% 43 434 64 278 80 401 188 113
25% 42 316 67 237 84 813 194 366
50% 36 715 69 085 88 683 194 484
75% 26 444 67 079 88 202 181 726
Share of expenditure tertiles to government revenue when excise tax increases by
Base case 23.8% 33.9% 42.2%
10% 23.1% 34.2% 42.7%
25% 21.8% 34.6% 43.6%
50% 18.9% 35.5% 45.6%
75% 14.6% 36.9% 48.5%
Base case refers to the case before the increase in excise tax. Government revenues
are estimated as a sum of excise taxes and value-added taxes paid by households in
each tertile k, using the following equation:
Government revenue¼P3k¼1Ck  [1þ (1kdk)] Tk þ
P3
k¼1Ck  [1þ (1kdk)] Vk
where Ck is the total consumption of smoker households in tertile k in the base case,
1k is the total price elasticity of cigarettes of tertile k and dk is the percentage
change in the average price of cigarettes purchased by the households in tertile k
because of the increase in excise tax for the increase in excise taxes by 10%, 25%,
50% or 75%.
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individual’s income varies over time and these changes might
affect the estimated distributional burden of excise taxes.
What this paper adds
▸ The literature shows that the current excise taxes on tobacco
are regressive based on the traditional regressivity argument,
that is, the poor pay a higher share of their income for
tobacco excise taxes than the rich, but increases in taxes are
assumed to be not regressive due to the higher sensitivity of
the poor who are expected to quit or reduce their
consumption dramatically.
▸ It is known that governments generate more revenue as tax
increases but none of the research clearly shows who is the
largest taxpayer from the equity perspective.
▸ This study looks at the regressivity argument (inequality of
tax payments) by applying a different technique, that is, by
using the Lorenz curve for tobacco taxes, and shows that
increases in excise tax are indeed progressive.
▸ It also shows that the traditional regressivity argument falls
short for higher tax policies: higher taxes are progressive,
paid practically by the rich and high-income groups, and the
part of increased revenues can be allocated for social
programmes from which not only the poor smokers but also
the poor can benefit the most.
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